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I have a good deal of interest in the topic of this panel, “Clinton Administra-
tion and Individual Rights.”  Given that, it was difficult to choose between the
two papers for comment.  There is a good deal to agree with in Professor Vo-
lokh’s effort—particularly the notion that, even in these new arenas, traditional
First Amendment concerns have real merit.1  It is likely, though, that Professor
Volokh and I would set up shop at different places on the slippery side of the
slope.
Professor Volokh himself acknowledges that the harassment issues he fo-
cuses on have not actually been major sources of attention for the Clinton Ad-
ministration.2  Indeed, it is remarkably hard to believe that one of President
Clinton’s principal legacies will be that Americans talk less about sex in the
workplace than they did before he came to office.
It might have been preferable, therefore, to explore the President’s willing-
ness to go along with the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).3  Alterna-
tively, we might have delved into the Administration’s efforts to defend the
CDA in Reno v. ACLU4—efforts that reduced Justice Stevens to sounding like
he had borrowed Justice Scalia’s word processor.  Stevens characterized the
government’s position as “singularly unpersuasive,”5 seriously flawed,6 based on
“incorrect factual premises,”7 reaching “a breadth of . . . coverage . . . wholly
unprecedented,”8 and “casting a . . . dark shadow over free speech”9 in the
United States.
We might also productively have criticized the President’s hugely unfortu-
nate “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.10  Even if well motivated, “don’t ask” now re-
sults in about twice as many exclusions of lesbians and gay men from the
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1. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton Ad-
ministration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 304 (Winter/Spring 2000).
2. See id. at 302-03.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133-145 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d)).
4. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
5. Id. at 885.
6. See id. at 872.
7. Id.  at 876.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 882.
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, At Unease, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1999, at 41.
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Armed Forces as occurred before its implementation.11  In stark terms, it tells
people who are not unfit to serve their country that they are.12  Now, “don’t ask”
is apparently being applied against a gay, Republican Arizona legislator—effec-
tively punishing him for statements made in open debate, on the floor of the
statehouse.13  One wonders what Alexander Mieklejohn would have thought of
that.14  Unlike the harassment strains Professor Volokh decries, the embrace of
the CDA and the development and enforcement of “don’t ask, don’t tell” are
clear Clinton Administration policies aimed at dramatically curtailing freedom
of expression.
There is also much to applaud in Professor Wax’s paper.15  She presents
powerful arguments, for example, that the brief against government involve-
ment in welfare is overblown.16  However, as she indicates, the focus of her ef-
fort is to defeat the normative claim that a right to basic economic security
should be included in the federal Constitution.17  People can accuse President
Clinton of many things, and they have, but attempting to privilege and to consti-
tutionalize welfare entitlements is surely not one of them.  I am a notoriously
bad political pundit, but even I am confident that few political movements in
the United States enjoy a more profound and unshakable dormancy than the
effort to constitutionalize a right to subsistence welfare.  The argument that
Professor Wax goes to such profound lengths to defeat, partially based some-
how on her reported perceptions of actual popular sentiment, has about as
much vitality in American political discourse as the move to establish a monar-
chy on this side of the Atlantic.  It is unlikely that it even rises to the level of a
straw man.
11. See Verdict Is In For “Don’t Ask,” L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at B10.
12. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 321 (1992).
13. I refer to the surprising case of  Republican Arizona legislator Steve May.  May had an accom-
plished career in the Army and, upon retirement, was elected to the Arizona legislature.  During the
heat of debate over an anti-gay measure, May made statements indicating that he is gay.  May was sub-
sequently recalled to active status—he had remained a reservist.  The Army is now considering both
May’s superior’s recommendation that he be promoted for outstanding service, and whether he should
be discharged from the military for violating “don’t ask, don’t tell.”  See Military Inquiry Targets Law-
maker Reservist: Steve May Focus of Gay-Policy Rule, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 1999, at A1; Gay
State Lawmaker Speaks Out—Assails Military’s Don’t Tell Rule, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1999, at
A1; Comment, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 16, 1999, at 12A.  If May is excluded from the military for
speaking out on the floor of the Arizona legislature, it may be the clearest violation of the First
Amendment in American history.
14. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J.
521; Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191 (each arguing for the highest protection for political expression);
see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
15. See Amy Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Politi-
cal Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (Winter/Spring 2000).
16. See id. at 282-88.
17. See id. at 261, 292-97.
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In my opinion, it might have been more useful to discuss the President’s de-
cisions on welfare reform.  More specifically, it would have been interesting to
explore the Administration’s feverish efforts to defend Governor Pete Wilson’s
scheme to discriminate against newly arrived California welfare recipients.18
The Wilson plan, which relegated welfare candidates who had lived in Califor-
nia less than one year to the amount of funding they could have obtained in
their prior state of residence, was thrown out rather unceremoniously by the
Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe.19  There, the Court found that the government’s
arguments were directly at odds with the foundational notion that “citizens of
the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose to be [full]
citizens of the state wherein they reside.”20  The Administration’s position, in
the Justices’ view, “would impose the most severe burdens on the neediest
members of the disfavored class.”21
Justice Ginsburg, a President Clinton appointee, was “astonished” at aspects
of the Administration’s argument.22  Justice Souter found them incomprehensi-
ble.23  In the Court’s view, this welfare reform was really just ganging up on
those least able to defend themselves—poor people who typically had not even
arrived in the state yet.  No one, of course, wants to look soft on the poor in an
election year.  Still, this was too much even for Justice Scalia.24
There are, though, a couple of notions in Professor Wax’s article worthy of
highlighting.  In crafting arguments against the constitutionalization of welfare
rights, she warns that “[f]actions that believe in vigorous welfare rights might
arise and gain undue influence.”25  This claim is akin to arguments made in ear-
lier drafts of her article that groups in power may pay insufficient attention to
“maintaining the background economic conditions” that generate ample wealth
to sustain the “common resource pool.”26
Of course, these are, in some sense, possibilities.  However, in reading the
article, it occurred to me that at this particular point in our history our problem
is almost exactly the opposite.  Getting elites and political decisionmakers to
pay sufficient attention to maintaining background economic conditions to
maintain the resource pool seems not to be our principal difficulty.
18. See 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
19. See id. at 510 (“The states . . . do not have any right to select their citizens.”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Oral Arg. at 29, Anderson v. Roe, No. Civ. A. 98-97, 1999 WL 22762 (Jan. 13, 1999).
23. See id. at 26.
24. Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion invalidating the California scheme. See Saenz, 526
U.S. at 491-93.  See generally Clinton Turns on the Least of These, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
May 28, 1999, at 62A.
25. See Wax, supra note 15, at 301 n.109.  As these papers go to press, I am in the somewhat un-
comfortable position of offering comments on what has become a much reduced sentiment in the final
version of Professor Wax’s paper.  In earlier drafts, she outlined a “perversity” argument, noting that
strong public welfare programs can work to kill the goose that laid the golden egg.  There she claimed
that “groups in power may pay insufficient attention to maintaining the background economic condi-
tions that generate ample wealth to maintain the common resource pool.”
26. See note 25.
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Consider the landscape.  First, politically speaking, as we veer between New
Democrats and New Republicans, it seems clear that one thing will remain con-
stant—questions of poverty, exclusion, and the economic interests of the bot-
tom half will be left off the table.27  The Republicans’ compassionate conserva-
tism and the Democrats’ conservative compassion cast their gaze away from
some of the most difficult problems of American life.  “Politics by the polls” is
no great friend to poverty issues or civil rights.28
Related to that, of course, and surely causing a good deal of it, we employ a
method of campaign finance that systematically favors those with substantial
economic power over those without it.  This is not the place to rehearse argu-
ments about campaign finance reform,29 but, to put it simply, as Justice White
wrote many years ago, the “candidate may be forced to please the spenders
rather than the voters, and the two groups are not identical.”30 A system in
which those who seek to obtain certain governmental policies are allowed to
give essentially unlimited amounts of money to the people who make the poli-
cies, may be called many things, but “democratic” and “fair” should not be high
on the list.31
27. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA
(1996); JIM HIGHTOWER, THERE’S NOTHING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD BUT YELLOW STRIPES
AND DEAD ARMADILLOS (1997); MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); ROBERT B. REICH,
LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997); see also ANNE PHILLIPS, WHICH EQUALITIES MATTER 13 (1999)
(“Politicians who once placed themselves on opposite ends of the political spectrum now seem united in
their defense of wide-ranging income differentials and their condemnation of ‘simple’ or ‘leveling’
equality.”).
28. See Gene Nichol, Candidates Play It by the Numbers, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 9,
1999, at 60A.
29. See Lilian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Prespective on the First Amendment and Campaign
Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045 (1985) (arguing against campaign finance reform); Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 301 (1989); Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1989).
30. Federal Election Comm. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 517
(1985) (White, J., dissenting).
31. Briefly put, American campaigns for important national office begin with a money primary—
only those with great wealth or access to wealth qualify as serious candidates.  Imagine explaining that
as a matter of democratic theory.  Next, federal candidates embark upon a remarkable money chase—
spending half or more of their time in office asking people for money.  These are, of course, full-time
jobs.  The nation is ill-served by officials spending so much time and energy on matters other than their
official jobs.  It is also clear to almost all Americans that if something becomes that important to an
official, amounting to half of the job or more, and so obviously tied to likelihood of continuing in office,
it will have a massive impact on job performance.  We may like to pretend that our legislators approach
total strangers, ask them for thousands or now hundreds of thousands of dollars, get it, and are
completely unaffected by it—achieving a state of near-total ingratitude.  However, we know it is not so.
As a result, the output of the legislative process is strongly affected by campaign financing.  This need
not, of course, amount to bribery, but if incumbents and challengers take positions that  are congenial
to powerful economic interests, they receive dramatic benefits in the electoral process through
substantial campaign contributions.  If candidates, on the other hand, pursue agendas emphasizing
poverty, welfare rights, and the like, prospects for campaign funding are dramatically diminished.  This
substantially distorts the political process in favor of the economically privileged.  It does not mean, of
course, that the wealthiest or best-funded candidate wins every race, but it effectively abridges rights of
equal political participation.
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Next, even among political philosophers, arguments for economic equality
have largely disappeared.  The current preoccupation with issues of cultural
domination has seemed to crowd out questions of economic justice.  It is almost
made to seem as if one cannot explore difference without rejecting, or at least
ignoring, economic egalitarianism.  Modest claims of universal entitlement to
public services or government benefits are regarded as anachronistic.  Extreme
differentials of income and wealth are viewed as either non-problematic or in-
evitable.32  The notion that some concept of economic equality might have a re-
lationship to political equality has dropped from view.  As Anne Phillips re-
cently wrote, “tainted as it is by the failures of socialism, and made to seem
hopelessly out of kilter with celebrations of diversity and choice, economic
equality is now [completely] off the agenda.”33
The academic left has been largely undisturbed.  Richard Rorty said last
year in the Massey Lectures that “we now have, among many American stu-
dents and teachers, a spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left; rather than a Left
which dreams of achieving our country.”34  That is strong language, but a Left
that has no projects to offer, no vision of our national life, no affirmative pro-
gram to be achieved by building a consensus on specific reforms, is not much of
a Left at all.35
This near abandonment of equality seems a surprising result in a country of
such unparalleled wealth.  Unfortunately, in this country, unparalleled wealth is
coupled with shockingly high infant mortality rates, huge numbers of children
living in poverty,36 ever growing numbers of Americans without health care,37
and tremendous gulfs between the wealthiest and poorest members of society.
In truth, we actually pay a good deal of attention, in the ebb and flow of or-
dinary politics, to the background economic conditions that generate the re-
source pool.38  What we now pay far less attention to is the question of economic
equality.  The Clinton Administration has not been alone in taking economic
32. See PHILLIPS, supra note 27, at 12-13.
33. Id. at 1.
Equality is now off the political agenda; nobody these days believes people can or should be
made equal.  That is true enough in one sense, very far from true in another.  Economic
equality has fallen into disuse, tainted as it is by the failures of socialism, and made to seem
hopelessly out of kilter with celebrations of diversity and choice.
 Id.
34. RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA 35 (1999).
35. See id. at 15.
36. See Paul Campos, Poor People Pay Bills for the Rich, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov.
16, 1999, at 63A (“One out of every four children in America lives below the poverty line.  One out of
every six American workers has no health insurance.”); Gene Nichol, Equality Has Been Taken Off
The Table, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 29, 1999, at 59A.
37. See NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, THE EROSION OF HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (May 9, 1999); Gene Nichol, Unhealthy Times for Have Nots,
DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 14, 1999, at 55A.  The most recent census figures indicate that
about 45 million Americans now have no health care coverage.  See Gene Nichol, Health Care Isn’t
There For Too Many, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 7, 1999, at A23.
38. Supra text accompanying note 26.
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fairness off the political agenda.  They have not been alone, but they have
clearly done their part.  That may not be the legacy of which they are the most
proud.  It may not even have been the legacy that they had in mind when they
started, but it is theirs nonetheless.  Ultimately, it may make matters like the
Antiterrorism Act,39 or the Defense of Marriage Act,40 the Immigration Act,41 or
the Communications Decency Act42 seem quite small by comparison.43
39. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
40. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997) and 28 U.S.C. §1738C (1997).
41. 8 U.S. C. § 1601 et seq. (1994); Immigration and Naturalization Act §§ 242(b)(a), 235(b)(1), 501
et seq.
42. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561 (1996).
43. But see Gene Nichol, Clinton Civil Rights Record Lousy, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Feb. 5, 1999, at 61A (arguing that President Clinton’s record on gay rights, privacy, free speech, and
due process issues is lackluster).
